In this study we use a sample of petroleum refining firms to examine whether earnings sensitivity measures are risk-relevant. Because actual earnings sensitivity measures as per the SEC's new market risk disclosure rules are either unavailable, incomplete or cross-sectionally uncomparable at the present time, we construct earnings sensitivity measures from extant information from historical financial statements. Our findings indicate that such simulated earnings sensitivity measures are positively associated with contemporaneous stock market determined oil exposures (oil betas). We also find that simulated earnings sensitivity measures are useful in predicting future oil betas after controlling for past oil betas and a number of alternate risk proxies. Our evidence suggests that earnings sensitivity measures provide risk-relevant information.
[1997a] are unavailable, incomplete or are not cross-sectionally comparable at the present time (see SEC [1998, p. 8, 18] , Roulstone [1999] and Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam and Welker [2000] ). Hence, we use extant public data to construct estimates of earnings sensitivity measure. In particular, we estimate how a firm's quarterly earnings change in response to a change in oil prices for a sample of oil and gas refiners over the period 1987 to 1996. We use such simulated earnings sensitivity to examine two potentially interesting research questions motivated by the aforementioned debate: (i) Is earnings sensitivity measurable or is it dominated by measurement error so as render it useless for evaluating firms' market risk exposures i.e., are earnings sensitivity measures risk-relevant? (ii) Does the earnings sensitivity measure predict future market-determined oil price exposure (hereafter, oil betas)?
We find that the simulated earnings sensitivity measure exhibits strong contemporaneous association with firms' oil betas. This suggests that the construct "earnings sensitivity" is reliable enough to communicate meaningful risk-relevant information. The simulated earnings sensitivity measure also explains cross-sectional variation in future oil betas after controlling for past oil beta, a number of competing risk proxies such as book to market ratio, size and leverage and segment information.
Moreover, we provide preliminary evidence that the simulated earnings sensitivity measure explains oil betas beyond derivatives data disclosed by some sample firms as per the tabular disclosure format -an alternate disclosure format allowed by SEC [1997a] .
Our findings have implications for the ongoing debate about the relevance of riskdisclosures. First, we document that explicit estimates of risk exposure in the form of earnings sensitivity measures are associated with market's perception of risk in a systematic and predictable manner and are hence unlikely to be misleading as some critics have claimed. Second, contrary to concerns expressed by Schrand and Elliot [1998] that historical risk measures may not be relevant for assessing a firm's future risk, we show that historical earnings sensitivity measures have predictive content for future oil betas. Third, our finding that earnings sensitivity measures possess incremental utility beyond tabular derivative disclosures suggests that our simulated measures capture aspects of firm's risk exposure (possibly underlying risk) not covered by extant tabular disclosures. This evidence is potentially useful to the SEC in their scheduled review of the new market risk disclosure requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background and discusses related research. The empirical relations and measurement of oil beta and earnings sensitivity are discussed in Section 3. We present our sample selection process and descriptive statistics in Section 4. Our empirical findings are reported in Section 5. Section 6 presents a summary and provides some concluding remarks.
Background and Related Research

SEC'S Market Risk Disclosure Rules
Beginning with filings for fiscal years ending after June 15, 1997 15, , SEC [1997a requires that firms disclose market risk exposure measured using one of three quantitative methods-the tabular format, the sensitivity analysis alternative and the value at risk method. 2 Under the tabular format, firms are required to disclose information regarding 2 In addition to quantitative disclosures, SEC [1997a] also mandates qualitative disclosures to help investors understand market risk exposures.
derivative and non-derivative market risk sensitive instruments outstanding at the end of a reporting period. The stated goal of tabular information is to give users enough data to compute their own sensitivity analysis or value at risk estimates. In contrast, the sensitivity analysis and value at risk formats present explicit estimates of losses and gains stemming from market risk fluctuations. The sensitivity analysis format requires firms to disclose the hypothetical gain or loss in future (defined by the SEC [1997a] as one-year ahead) earnings, cash flows or fair values due to a hypothetical change in market risk. We focus on the sensitivity analysis alternative because analysts polled by the SEC rate sensitivity analysis disclosures as the most useful of the three alternative methods (SEC [1998, p. 18] ).
Moreover, the SEC views the tabular format disclosures as providing primitive information that investors can use to eventually compute their own sensitivity estimates.
A review of the annual reports for the years 1997 and 1998 for our sample of 25 refiners reveals the diversity in disclosures made by our sample firms. 3 Of the 25 firms, 7 firms provide sensitivity disclosures, one firm provides value at risk estimate of derivative positions at year-end, while 21 firms provide tabular disclosures of derivative positions at year-end. 4 In addition to the diversity in the reporting format used by firms in providing risk disclosures, we observe considerable variation within the sensitivity disclosure format.
Of the 7 firms that disclose sensitivity analysis estimates, 3 report the effect on refining margins, one firm reports the effect of oil price risk on the fair value of its derivatives whereas 3 firms disclose the threshold earnings level at which the impact of oil price risk is 3 Elmy, LeGuyader and Linsmeier [1998] survey a broader sample of non-financial firms and find similar diversity. A recent survey conducted by the SEC (SEC [1998, p. 8, 18] ) also finds that disclosures are too diverse to allow cross-sectional comparability at the present time. 4 The breakup of disclosures by type does not add up to the total of 25 firms because of multiple disclosures by firms.
immaterial. Note that most firms did not report measures of on-balance sheet exposures. Thornton and Welker [1999] report similar difficulties with risk disclosures in their study of energy-intensive companies. Diversity in available sensitivity analysis measures presents a challenge for conducting empirical evaluation of these disclosures at the present time. Hence, we construct simulated earnings sensitivity measures from historical quarterly earnings and oil prices. However, we exploit the tabular derivative disclosures reported by sample firms to provide preliminary evidence on whether our simulated earnings sensitivity measures can explain more of the variation in market-determined oil betas than tabular derivative disclosures.
Because we examine simulated and not actual earnings sensitivity measures, it is pertinent to discuss the similarities and differences between our simulated earnings sensitivity measure and the earnings sensitivity measure mandated by the SEC. Three apparent differences need elaboration. First, our measure captures the net earnings sensitivity from both underlying non-derivative items and derivatives whereas the SEC requires firms to report earnings sensitivity from derivatives but encourages firms to voluntarily disclose earnings sensitivity from non-derivative items. We cannot isolate the effect of derivatives alone because time-series data on commodity derivatives' usage is unavailable. However, an interpretive note issued by the SEC further clarifies that firms are allowed to report sensitivity from non-derivative items after netting off the sensitivity from derivatives (see SEC [1997b, p. 10] ). Moreover, the SEC rules require firms to explicitly discuss factors that limit their disclosures from fully reflecting their net market risk exposures. Second, our simulated earnings sensitivity measure captures the impact of change in operations on account of changes in oil price risk although SEC [1997a] does not explicitly require firms to incorporate the effect of changes in firms operations due to price risk.
However, the SEC does allow firms to use more sophisticated analyses that measure the elasticity of earnings to changes in prices (SEC [1997b, p. 17] ). Elasticity of earnings to price risk would include the price sensitivity of operating factors that affect earnings.
Third, although the sensitivity analysis format requires firms to disclose the hypothetical gain or loss in future earnings from a hypothetical change in market risk, we compute our simulated earnings sensitivity measure as the elasticity of historical earnings to realized oil price changes. The interpretive note (SEC [1997b, p. 18] ) clarifies that a firm can alternatively report either the average, high or low amounts of earnings sensitivity during the fiscal year. Our simulated earnings sensitivity measure can be viewed as the average earnings sensitivity of a firm over the time-window used to estimate such a measure.
Apart from the aforementioned differences, an important limitation of our simulated measure is that it cannot capture the flexibility that SEC [1997a] gives managers in choosing the model and relevant parameters used to compute earnings sensitivity.
However, we capture some elements of this flexibility because reported earnings--on which earnings sensitivity estimations are based--is itself subject to managerial discretion (see Schipper [1989] , Healy and Wahlen [1998] ).
Related Research
Seminal work by Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes [1970] finds that earnings variability is the most significant accounting variable in explaining systematic equity risk (see Ryan [1997] for an excellent summary). Recently, Scholes [1996] exhorts the accounting profession to develop a dynamic accounting system with a focus on how risk exposures change in response to various market risk exposures such as interest rate movements, currency price movements and commodity price movements. Scholes' [1996] comments in conjunction with findings by Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970] suggest that decomposing earnings variability into portions attributable to various market risk factors would be potentially useful to investors in risk assessment. Accordingly, we examine whether one component of earnings variability arising from oil price risk is related to the sensitivity of firms' equity values to oil price movements.
Although market risk affects all firms, most extant studies on risk disclosures focus on banks. One of the important reasons for such focus is that measures of banks' nonderivative interest rate risk are readily available in the form of maturity gap (Schrand [1997] , McAnally [1996] ) or the fair value gains and losses of on-balance sheet assets and liabilities (Collins and Venkatachalam [1996] ). However, as Petersen and Thiagarajan [1998] point out, measurement of non-derivative exposure for non-financial firms has received limited attention. This is because, unlike maturity gap and fair value gains and losses of on-balance sheet items for financial institutions, explicit risk measures that are reasonably consistent over time and comparable across firms at any given time are not widely reported by non-financial firms.
Researchers have responded to the lack of cross-sectionally comparable disclosures, especially for non-derivative risk exposures by making clever research design choices. For example, Wong [1998] uses foreign exchange gains and losses reported under SFAS 52 as a measure of the non-derivative foreign currency exposure for a sample of multinational firms. Tufano [1998] and Rajgopal [1999] use extant disclosures of firms' mineral reserves to control for firms' non-derivative risk exposures in the mining industry. Guay [1999] circumvents the need to explicitly measure non-derivative risk exposure for his sample of new derivative users on the grounds that non-derivative risk exposure is constant over a short period of one year. Dietrich, Kachelmeier, Klienmuntz and Linsmeier [1998] create disclosures similar to those required by SEC [1997a] disclosures in a laboratory setting.
Petersen and Thiagarajan [1998] measure the gold-price sensitivity of various measures of non-derivative exposure such as revenues, cash flows and investment opportunities using time-series data for two gold mining firms. Our simulated earnings sensitivity measure is similar to that estimated by Petersen and Thiagarajan [1998] in that we conduct firm-byfirm regressions of historical earnings against realized oil price changes to assess the simulated earnings sensitivity for a cross-section of firms within the refining industry.
We focus on measuring earnings sensitivity to oil prices for a sample of oil refiners in an effort to improve the probability of finding firms with significant earnings exposure to a single commodity price. In a related study in the energy industry, Rajgopal [2000] uses a sample of oil producers to show that fair value sensitivity measures similar to the SEC's tabular and sensitivity analysis disclosures, are risk-relevant. Fair value sensitivity refers to exposure from changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability whereas earnings sensitivity refers to exposure to variability in earnings of a recognized asset or liability. In contrast, our study examines earnings sensitivity. Fair value sensitivity is an appropriate measure of risk exposure for oil and gas producers because market risk exposure for such companies arises predominantly from fluctuations in the fair value of oil and gas reserves. 5 Earnings sensitivity is a more appropriate measure of risk for refining firms because oil price exposure in the refining business stems primarily from fluctuations in revenues and costs from refining operations caused by oil price variability. 6 Hence, we focus on earnings sensitivity for our sample of refining firms.
Research Method and Estimation Procedures
Model And Empirical Relations
We use a simple earnings capitalization model to develop predictions for the relationship between earnings sensitivity and the elasticity of stock price (oil beta) in response to an oil price change:
where, V is the market value of the firm's equity, E is the earnings and r is the discount rate and t refers to year. Assuming earnings follow a random walk, we can further simplify the relationship as follows:
where ρ is the capitalization factor.
The impact of a percentage change in the firm's market value for a 1% shock to oil 5 Nevertheless, we estimate earnings sensitivity for a sample of oil and gas producers drawn from SIC code 1311 (oil and gas production). We find that the estimated earnings sensitivity parameters were not statistically associated with the sensitivity of stock returns to oil price changes of these firms (oil betas). This empirical evidence is consistent with the argument that earnings sensitivity may not be the appropriate risk measure for oil and gas producers. 6 Although our sample firms are predominantly refiners, a few of our firms are vertically integrated in that they refine some of the crude oil that they themselves produce. However, the proportion of revenue attributable to oil and gas production for the median sample firm is just 17%.
prices over a small increment of time can be represented as follows:
Multiplying both sides of (2) by p/V and recognizing that V = ρE from (1), we have:
The left hand side of equation (3) represents the oil beta (β oil ), while the right hand side represents the earnings sensitivity (γ es ). Equation (4) indicates that the percentage change in a firm's earnings in response to an oil price shock would result in the same percentage change in the firm's returns. That is, there is a one to one relationship between oil beta and earnings sensitivity. Extending this intuition to a cross-sectional regression context gives us the following empirical specification:
where i refers to firm subscript. We interpret a positive coefficient on α 1 as evidence of risk-relevance of earnings sensitivity measures.
Although the theoretical value of α 1 is 1, we merely expect α 1 to be positive for several reasons. First, β oil and γ es need to be empirically estimated because they are not directly observable. Hence, there may be measurement error in both β oil and γ es estimates.
Second, the empirical specification (in equation (5)) is derived on the basis of a relationship between the equity value and earnings that is valid at a point in time (equation (1)). 7 As an alternative to the simple valuation approach used in equation (1) we can consider a framework proposed by Ohlson [1995] with no qualitative change in the expected positive relation between oil beta and earnings sensitivity. Specifically, under the Ohlson [1995] model, we can represent stock price as a function of both current earnings and lagged book value (see the appendix in Collins, Pincus and Xie [1999] ). Because past book value is insensitive to a current oil price change, equation (3) obtains with a different ρ parameter.
However, we have to use a long time-series of data to estimate both β oil and γ es. This, implicitly assumes that these measures remain constant over a period of time. Third, we assume that the capitalization factor is unaffected by oil price changes. This may introduce additional measurement error in the sensitivity estimates. Fourth, the effect of oil price changes on earnings may be understated because firms may use discretionary accounting accruals to temper fluctuations in earnings caused by large oil price changes (see Petersen and Thiagarajan [1998] ). For example, Han and Wang [1998] suggest that refiners use income decreasing accruals to avoid reporting windfall earnings resulting from abnormally high oil prices during the Gulf War. Fifth, while the earnings capitalization model is useful in motivating our empirical tests, it may be incomplete. In other words, there may be other value-relevant variables that are influenced by oil prices and hence, omitted from equation (5). 8 Last, rising and falling oil price changes may have an asymmetric effect on earnings possibly due to conservatism in accounting practices. However, we explicitly investigate this asymmetry when we conduct robustness checks.
Estimation Procedure for the Earnings Sensitivity Measure
To estimate earnings sensitivity of each firm, we use contiguous quarterly earnings of firms over the period 1987 to 1996. Specifically, we use the following specification to estimate earnings sensitivity for a firm i:
In equation (6) The manner in which the percentage change in oil prices (%∆P oi1 ) is measured requires some elaboration. We could measure the variable either as the percentage change in quarter-end oil prices or the percentage change in average oil price over quarter q compared to the average oil price over quarter q-1 (see Petersen and Thiagarajan [1998] ).
The average oil price for the quarter q is the average of daily oil prices during quarter q.
Because revenues booked during quarter q depend on the path of oil prices during the quarter, percentage change in average price is the appropriate measure for assessing the revenue component of earnings sensitivity. However, cost of goods sold (COGS) is likely to change more slowly than revenues. Hence, change in quarter-end oil prices may be the appropriate measure for evaluating the COGS component of earnings sensitivity. A priori, it is not obvious whether revenue or COGS sensitivity will dominate earnings sensitivity.
Hence, we report the results of all our empirical tests with respect to both measures of oil return-percentage, i.e., change in average quarterly oil price (%∆P ave, oi1,q ) and the percentage change in quarter-end oil prices (%∆P end,oi1,q Note that equation (6b) includes the percentage change in quarter-end prices related to quarter q-1. Percentage change in prices related to quarter q-1 accounts for potential lagged response in earnings to oil price shocks due to factors such as production and inventory stickiness (Thurman [1988] , Pindyck [1993, 1994] ) and the market power of refiners selling branded products (Borenstein and Shepard [1997] ). A lagged oil return term is not included in the specification (6a) because the percentage change in average quarterly oil prices already includes such lagged effects. In equation (6b), the estimate of earnings sensitivity (γ i,es,end ) is obtained by adding coefficients γ i1,es,end and γ i2,es,end . Serial correlation may remain in the error terms even after including the change in seasonally lagged quarterly earnings as an independent variable. Hence, we use the maximum likelihood method that controls for serial-correlation to estimate (6a) and (6b).
Estimation Procedure for Oil Beta
Typically, oil price exposure is expressed as the effect of stock price changes to oil price changes. Hence, we use a standard multi-factor market model to measure oil betas:
In equation (7), R it is the daily stock return for firm i for day t, R mt is the daily return on value weighted market portfolio for day t, R oilt is the daily percentage change in oil prices for day t. The oil beta, β i,oil , represents the sensitivity of firm i's stock return to a 1% change in the price of oil, after controlling for changes in market wide stock prices that affect a firm's return. While it is advantageous to use daily data to estimate oil beta especially when oil exposures are non-stationary, daily data may induce bias in beta estimates if the underlying stocks trade infrequently. To address the infrequent-trading problem, we use the approach suggested by Dimson [1979] . The approach involves using a lead and a lag oil return to the multi-factor model and aggregating the contemporaneous, lead and lag oil beta.
Specifically, a refiner's stock price sensitivity to oil price return is captured by the Dimson oil beta,
The Dimson oil beta is the dependent variable in the cross-sectional tests of association conducted in this study.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain financial statement data for all petroleum refining firms (SIC code 2911) [1999] ). Note that the standard deviation in the quarterly oil return (0.25%) is eight times as much as the mean return (0.03%). Hence, the sample period 1987-1996 was characterized by considerable variation in oil prices. Figure 1 plots the behavior of oil prices during the sample period. As one might expect, the period around the Gulf War, i.e., from the third quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 1991, is noteworthy for substantially higher oil prices. The descriptive statistics on other relevant financial statement variables are presented in Panel B of Table 2 .
Earnings sensitivity for each refiner is estimated using all available quarterly data over the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] . Table 3 presents the summary statistics for such estimates.
The estimates are presented for specifications where oil return is defined as the percentage change in average quarterly oil prices (equation (6a)) and the percentage change in quarterend prices (equation (6b)). Because the period during the Gulf War (third quarter of 1990
to the first quarter of 1991) was characterized by abnormally high oil prices, we estimate specifications where we allow an intercept shift and a slope shift for the Gulf war period.
Specifically, we include a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 (0) if observations belong (did not belong) to any of the Gulf war quarters. The dummy variable is also interacted with the oil return variable to capture any slope shifts during the Gulf war quarters. 9 The descriptive statistics for the earnings sensitivity measures are similar when the two specifications (6a) and (6b) are considered. Results based on specification (6a) without controlling for the Gulf war period indicate that for a 1% change in oil prices the quarterly earnings change by 0.29% (0.22%) for the median (mean) firm. The corresponding median (mean) earnings sensitivity estimate for specification (6b) is 0.24 (0.24). When we control for the Gulf war period, the median (mean) earnings sensitivity measure becomes 0.27 (0.08) and 0.30 (0.09) for specifications (6a) and (6b) respectively. We conduct a t-test (Wilcoxon test) to assess whether the mean (median) earnings sensitivity measures estimated with and without controls for the Gulf war period observations and find no statistically significant differences. Moreover, the median and mean earnings sensitivity is not significantly different regardless of which of the four estimation methods is considered.
It is also interesting to note that a significant number of firms (ranging from 64% to 76%) have positive earnings exposure to oil price movements. The proportion of significant earnings sensitivity estimates (12% to 28%) is not extremely surprising because the earnings sensitivity measures are averages over the period 1986 to 1996 whereas the theory underlying equation (1) requires earnings sensitivity to be measured more frequently for finer time periods. The empirical tests of association between oil betas and earnings sensitivity assume that estimated earnings sensitivity measures have enough systematic information about risk that they are not completely swamped by measurement error. To the extent that measurement error dominates information content in the earnings sensitivity measures we will fail to detect a relation between oil betas and earnings sensitivity measures. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics on market based oil price exposure, β oil .
Oil betas are estimated with daily return data over the years 1987-1996. The results suggest that ceteris paribus a 1% change in oil price results in a 0.09% (0.10%) change in equity returns for the mean (median) firm. The median oil beta for our sample of refiners is substantially lower than 0.30, the median oil beta for a sample of oil producers examined by Rajgopal [1999] . This is not surprising because producers are long in oil and gas on account of their reserve holdings and hence, have higher oil and gas price exposure. Our median oil beta is smaller than that for producers because our sample firms are mostly integrated refiners who have long oil positions due to oil reserves but offsetting short oil positions due to refining operations. Our median oil beta is slightly higher than the median oil beta (0.06) reported by Thornton and Welker [1999] for a sample of energy-intensive firms consisting of oil and gas producers, refiners, gas transmission companies and electric service firms. We also note that equity values of most refiners in the sample are positively correlated with oil price changes because 84% of oil betas are positive. This is consistent with the earlier observation that a majority of earnings sensitivity estimates are positive.
Results
Contemporaneous Association
In this section, we report results on the contemporaneous association between oil betas and earnings sensitivity. If earnings sensitivity is a measurable construct not completely dominated by measurement error, we would observe a statistically significant association between oil betas and earnings sensitivity. We find that the correlation between earnings sensitivity and oil betas estimated for each firm is high (ranging from 0.55 to 0.66) and is statistically significant at 5% level for all specifications (see Panel A of Table 5 ).
Thus, earnings sensitivity appears to be relevant for assessing firms' oil price risk exposure.
However, the correlation-based association assumes that a firm's oil beta and earnings sensitivity remain constant over time. Yet, the economic and the regulatory environment facing the sample firms may have changed over time. Hence, we relax the assumption of inter-temporal stationarity in oil betas and earnings sensitivity by estimating these variables over six five-year overlapping time windows starting with the 1987-91 till 1992-96. The five-year window may be viewed as a compromise in that we assume stationarity over only a small portion of the sample period and yet have enough time-series observations to estimate earnings sensitivity parameters. Panel B of Table 5 presents results of the association between oil beta and earnings sensitivity based on a pooled sample of firmyears from these six overlapping windows.
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Pooling observations across six overlapping windows obviously exposes the inferences to the problem of serial-correlation in error terms across the five windows and cross-sectional correlation for a given window. We correct for both types of correlation using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. We also report results for a specification where α 1 is computed for each of the 10 The results reported in Panel B of Table 5 use the earnings sensitivity measures estimated without explicit controls for the Gulf war period. However, our inferences are unchanged when earnings sensitivity measures are estimated with explicit controls for the Gulf war period. We report our remaining results using earnings sensitivity measures that do not include controls for the Gulf war period because our results are qualitatively similar when using earnings sensitivity measures that use explicit controls for the Gulf war period. six windows and then averaged across the six windows.
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As predicted, the coefficient α 1 is positive (ranging from 0.06 to 0.08) and statistically significant at the 1% level for all reported specifications. The adjusted R 2 s range from 19% to 24%. Overall, these regression-results corroborate our correlation-based evidence on the risk-relevance of earnings sensitivity measures.
Benchmarks for Assessing Risk-Relevance of the Computed Earnings Sensitivity Measure
The contemporaneous association tests reported above are reassuring in that earnings sensitivity appears to be risk-relevant. However, it would be useful to calibrate the explanatory power of the simulated earnings sensitivity measure against alternate benchmarks. In the following sections, we evaluate the explanatory power of the earnings sensitivity measure against four benchmarks. First, we examine whether simulated earnings sensitivity measures can explain variation in future (one-year ahead) oil betas after controlling for past oil betas (Section 5.2.1). Next, we investigate the association between earnings sensitivity measures and oil betas after controlling for alternative risk proxies and control variables (Section 5.2.2). Finally, we assess the incremental ability of our simulated sensitivity measures to explain oil betas relative to the information disclosed under the SEC's tabular disclosures (Section 5.2.3). Barth [1994] ). In addition, we also conduct window specific correlation analysis. The results (unreported) suggest that for 4 of the 6 estimation windows the relation between oil betas and earnings sensitivity measures are significantly positive at the 5% level (one-tailed).
Weaker associations for individual time-windows may result from lack of power due to small number of sample observations in each time-window.
Predictive Content of Earnings Sensitivity Estimates for Future Oil Betas
In this sub-section, we assess the predictive ability of our earnings sensitivity estimates for one-year ahead oil beta. Such assessment is motivated by claims that historical risk measures --a suggested alternative to the SEC's new forward looking risk measures --may not have predictive information content for a firm's future exposures (Schrand and Elliot [1998] , Stulz and Williamson [1997] ). To perform this test we estimate historical earnings sensitivity measures over five-year overlapping windows and correlate them with the oil betas estimated over the year following the end of the five-year window. For example, the earnings sensitivity measures estimated over the window 1988-92 (1990-94) will be correlated with oil betas estimated over the year 1993 (1995). We modify equation (5) to examine the cross-sectional relation between historical earnings sensitivity measures and future oil betas:
where β oil denotes oil beta, γ es denotes earnings sensitivity measure, subscript f denotes the future period (one-year ahead) for which oil beta is estimated (f=1992, 93,…, 96) and it corresponds to the five year estimation window (w = 1987-91, 1988-92,…1991-95) for the earnings sensitivity measure. As before, serial and cross-correlation in error terms is addressed using the GMM procedure. A positive δ 1 would be consistent with historical earnings sensitivity measures providing information in predicting future oil betas.
Regression results from estimating equation (9) are reported in Panel A of Table 6 .
Results related to earnings sensitivity measure estimated using average oil prices and quarter end oil prices are reported separately. As predicted, the coefficient δ 1 is positive in all specifications and statistically significant. This indicates that earnings sensitivity measures provide risk-relevant information in predicting future oil betas.
Beaver et al. [1970] argue that a stronger test of predictive ability of accounting information for future market based risk measure is to test the predictive ability after controlling for information in current market based risk measure. This argument is predicated on the inter-temporal stationarity of the market-based measures. Consistent with this argument, we find that one-year ahead oil betas are significantly correlated with current oil betas (see Panel B of Table 6 ). Hence, we compare the predictive ability of historical earnings sensitivity measures against a naïve predictive model that assumes that future oil beta will be equal to current oil beta. Our empirical specification to test the incremental predictive ability of earnings sensitivity is as follows:
If the historical earnings sensitivity measures are incrementally relevant in assessing future oil betas, we would expect δ 1 to be significantly positive despite the inclusion of current period oil beta. Results of estimating equation (10) are reported in Panel C of Table   6 . The coefficient δ 1 continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications (average oil price and quarter-end oil price). Overall, our evidence is inconsistent with claims that historical earnings sensitivity measures are not useful for assessing future oil betas.
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12 To further explore the predictive ability of historical earnings sensitivity measures, we assess whether past earnings sensitivity measures are associated with future earnings sensitivity measures. Specifically, we divide the sample period 1986 to 1996 into two equal time periods and examine the correlation between earnings sensitivity estimated in the first half of the sample period with that estimated using observations in the second half of the time period. We find that past earnings sensitivity thus defined is strongly associated with future earnings sensitivity (correlation of 0.51 (0.57) with specification 6a (6b), both significant at p < 0.01).
Alternative Risk Proxies and Control Variables
Next, we assess whether the earnings sensitivity measure is associated with oil betas after controlling for potential omitted variables. Following prior research (e.g., Wong 1999), we consider three risk proxies: size, book-to-market and leverage. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of average total assets during the estimation window, book to market is the average over the estimation window of the book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity at quarter-end and leverage is the average over the estimation window of the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. We also include segment information, i.e., the percentage of total sales from both production (Proseg) and refining segments (Refseg) as independent variables to assess whether earnings sensitivity measures explain cross-sectional variation in oil betas above and beyond such segment data.
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The segment information is hand-collected from the 1996 10-Ks for the sample firms. 14 We examine the relevance of earnings sensitivity measure after including the control variables in the empirical specification for both contemporaneous association tests (equation (5)) and tests of predictive ability (equation (9, 10) ). Results presented in Table 7 suggest that the introduction of control variables does not materially alter the results obtained previously for the association between earnings sensitivity and oil betas. The coefficient on size is consistently positive and statistically significant, suggesting that larger firms have higher oil exposures. The coefficients on leverage and book-to-market ratio are, 13 Note that the combined proportion of refining and production segments will not add to 100% because most of the refiners in our sample have revenues from other segments (e.g., chemicals) as well.
14 Using the 1996 annual report information assumes that the percentage contribution from production and refining segments remains constant over the period 1986 to 1996. We believe that this assumption is reasonable because a random examination of a few firms indicates that the sales proportion do not vary significantly across years. however, insignificant. The coefficient on the Proseg is positive and statistically significant in all cases except for specification (10) suggesting that firms with greater involvement oil and gas production tend to have higher oil betas. This is consistent with prior evidence (Rajgopal [1999] ) that indicates a higher positive oil exposure for oil and gas producers.
Tabular Disclosures
Finally, we evaluate whether earnings sensitivity measures are incrementally riskrelevant in assessing market-determined oil betas over and above the SEC's tabular disclosures. As mentioned before in Section 2.1, an adequate number of sensitivity analysis measures are not available at the present time to assess whether our earnings sensitivity measure explains variation in oil betas that is above and beyond the official SEC sensitivity disclosures. However, a significant number (21) of firms disclose the fair values of their oil and gas derivative positions at year-end in their 1997 and 1998 annual reports as per the tabular disclosure requirement of the SEC provide tabular disclosures for derivative positions at year-end. We compute the change in the fair value of oil and gas derivative positions during the year adjusted for related realized gains and losses during the year. Consistent with previous work by Wong [1998] , we scale such change by the market value of equity and the yearly oil price return during the year. Such scaled fair value change in derivatives (CHFV) can be considered the fair value sensitivity of derivatives computed from tabular disclosures.
Because the disclosures are obtained for 1997 and 1998, we estimate the Dimson oil beta (described in Section 3.3) for 1997 and 1998 and use that as our dependent variable.
We use the earnings sensitivity measure estimated using quarterly data over the period 1987-96 (see Table 3 ) and benchmark it against the fair value sensitivity measure. In particular, we assess whether the simulated earnings sensitivity measure provides information that complements the fair-value sensitivity of derivatives derived from tabular disclosures. We estimate the following specification:
where CHFV is the change in fair value of derivatives scaled by market value of equity and oil return, and j represent years 1997 and 1998. We predict the coefficient on CHFV to be positive, consistent with the prediction in Wong [1998] . However, the sign on the coefficient may deviate from expectations because of potential measurement error in CHFV. As before, we predict the coefficient on earnings sensitivity, ν 1 , to be positive. For estimating equation (11) we are left with only 23 firm-year observations due to lack of data for computing either oil betas or changes in fair values.
Results are presented in Table 8 . As predicted, the coefficient on earnings sensitivity, ν 1 , is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on CHFV is also positive and strongly significant in one of the specifications. Nonetheless, the evidence here is consistent with the simulated earnings sensitivity measure providing information incremental to the tabular derivative disclosures, possibly information related to underlying non-derivative risk exposures. Given that the SEC disclosures are in their infancy and that the tabular disclosures are incomplete in that they include only the changes in fair values of derivatives, we view this evidence as preliminary.
Robustness Checks
The tenor of the results is unchanged when earnings sensitivity is measured in two alternate ways: (1) sensitivity of quarterly ROA (earnings per unit of previous quarter total assets) to concurrent and lagged quarterly oil return after controlling for seasonal quarterly ROA; and (2) sensitivity of seasonally adjusted difference in quarterly earnings per share to a unit change in concurrent and lagged average quarterly price per barrel. Our inferences are also unchanged when we estimate oil betas without including the market index in equation (8).
As pointed out in section 3.1, rising and falling oil price changes have an asymmetric effect on earnings possibly due to conservatism in accounting practices whereby unrealized losses due to oil price changes are recognized faster than unrealized gains (e.g., lower of cost or market rule to value inventory or asset writedowns when oil prices fall). On the other hand, rising and falling prices may map into stock returns equivalently, ceteris paribus. Thus, the risk-relevance of earnings sensitivity measures may be attenuated because our estimation procedure (equations 6a, 6b) implicitly assumes that rising and falling prices map into returns and earnings symmetrically. To assess the validity of that assumption, we modify equations (6a) and (6b) to incorporate rising and falling price environments. Specifically, we include two variables %∆P (+) and %∆P (-) instead of just %∆P. The variable, %∆P (+) measures the oil price change during quarters of increasing oil prices and is zero otherwise. The variable, %∆P (-) is the amount of oil price change during quarters of decreasing oil prices and zero otherwise. The estimated earnings sensitivity coefficient for periods of increasing oil prices was statistically distinguishable from that on decreasing oil prices for only 2 of the 25 sample firms. In a similar vein, we verify whether oil betas for rising oil price periods are different from oil betas for falling oil price periods. We modify equation (8) firms, we found that rising price period oil beta was statistically distinguishable from falling price period oil beta. Hence, the potential asymmetric impact of rising and falling oil prices is not expected to have a major impact on our inferences.
The paper concentrates on measuring the sensitivity of earnings changes to the average oil price change during a quarter as opposed to the volatility of oil price changes during a quarter. To assess the impact of oil price volatility, we compute standard deviation of daily oil price return during each quarter and introduce such deviation as an independent variable while estimating equations (6a) and (6b). We found a statistically significant coefficient on standard deviation in 1 out of 25 cases. More importantly, the risk-relevance results reported in the paper are unchanged when earnings sensitivity is computed after including standard deviation of oil price return in specifications (6a) and (6b).
Summary and Conclusions
Although the SEC recently mandated the use of earnings sensitivity measures, little is known about the empirical properties of these measures. Because actual sensitivity disclosures are somewhat spotty at the present time, we simulate firm-specific earnings sensitivity to oil price risk for a sample of 25 refiners. We find that simulated earnings sensitivity parameters exhibit strong contemporaneous associations with market determined oil betas. Such association casts doubts on claims that sensitivity analysis disclosures are noisy or misleading to fairly represent firm's market risk profiles. We also find that past earnings sensitivity is significantly associated with one-year-ahead oil betas after controlling for previous year's oil beta and a number of alternate risk proxies such as size, book to market, and leverage and segment information. Further, our simulated measures provide incremental information about firm's oil betas over and above SEC's tabular derivative disclosures.
The ability to generalize the findings in this study to a broader population of firms is limited for several reasons. First, the analysis is restricted to firms from one industry.
Although our focus on the refining industry enables us to concentrate on a clear, industrywide market risk exposure, there is no assurance that our results would hold for other industries. Second, there are inherent limitations in using public data to parallel sensitivity analysis disclosures. On the one hand, publicly available distributions of firm's earnings and oil prices enable us to assess whether sensitivity analysis disclosures similar to the SEC are risk-relevant. However, actual sensitivity disclosures as per SEC [1997a] may incorporate more information about firm's future plans and competitors than what is readily observable from public data. At the same time, management may opportunistically distort the actual SEC sensitivity disclosures more than the reported earnings measures that we use to compute our "as-if" earnings sensitivity measures. An investigation into the riskrelevance of the new SEC sensitivity disclosures may have to wait till enough time-series realizations of such disclosures are available for a set of firms. We may then to be able to assess whether the new disclosures are incrementally informative beyond the sensitivity measures estimated from extant earnings information in this paper. 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year Oil Price ($ per barrel)
Gulf War Period Table 3 Descriptive statistics for earnings sensitivity measures estimated over 1987 -1996 The Table 4 Descriptive statistics for oil price sensitivity estimated over 1987-96
The table summarizes the statistics for the oil and market beta estimates from two-factor market model regressions for the sample of 25 refiners. In equation (8), R it is the daily return for refiner i for day t, R m,t+k is the daily return on value weighted market portfolio for day t+k, R oil,t+k is the daily percentage change in oil prices on day t+k. Crude oil prices used in this study are obtained from the benchmark crude oil price series known as "West Texas Intermediate." Reported oil and market betas represent the Dimson adjusted oil and market betas. w=1987-91,1988-92, 1989-93, 1990-94,1991-95,1992-96) for estimating oil beta (β oil ) and earnings sensitivity measure (γ es ). 2. Regression estimates are obtained using the Generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure that accounts for both serial correlation and cross-sectional correlation in error terms. 3. t-statistics are presented in paranthesis. For mean of window specific regressions we present the Z statistic in parenthesis computed as follows:
where w represents window, k represents degree of freedom and W represents the number of windows. */**/*** represents one-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. t=1992,1993,1994,1995,1996) for which oil beta (β oil ) is estimated. Subscript w represents the corresponding five year estimation window (w=1987-91,1988-92,1989-93,1990-94,1991-95) for earnings sensitivity measure (γ es ). For example for an oil beta estimation period of 1993, the corresponding five year estimation window for the earnings sensitivity measure is 1988-92. 2. Regression estimates are obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to address serial correlation and cross-correlation in error terms. the number of windows. */**/*** represents one-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Table 7 Tests of association (pooled regression) between earnings sensitivity measures and oil betas after including size, book-to-market, leverage and segment information β ioil,w = α 0 + α 1 γ ies,w + ε iw (5) β ioil,f = δ 0 + δ 1 γ ies,w + ε if (9) β ioil,f = δ 0 + δ 1 γ ies,w + δ 2 β ioil,f-1 + ε if (10) (5), subscript w represents the five year estimation window (w=1987-91,1988-92, 1989-93, 1990-94,1991-95,1992-96) for estimating oil beta (β oil ) and earnings sensitivity measure (γ es ). 2. For equations (9) and (10), subscript f represents the years (t=1992,1993,1994,1995,1996) for which oil beta is estimated. Subscript w represents the corresponding five year estimation window (w=1987-91,1988-92,1989-93,1990-94,1991-95) for earnings sensitivity measure. For example for an oil beta estimation period of 1993, the corresponding five year estimation window for the earnings sensitivity measure is 1988-92. 3. Size is measured as the log of average total assets over the estimation window w, Leverage is defined as the average computed over the estimation window w of the ratio of long term debt to total assets, bookto-market is the average computed over the estimation window w of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, Refseg refers to the proportion of refining segment sales, Proseg refers to the proportion of sales from production segment. 4. Regression estimates are obtained using the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure that addresses both serial correlation and cross-correlation in error terms. 5. t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. */**/*** represents one-tailed significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
